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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Book Reviews
SOME LESSONS FROM OUR LEGAL HiSToRY, by W. S. Holdsworth. New
York: The Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. 198.
The publication of this diminutive volume, with its less than two hun-
dred pages, by the author of the monumental "History of English Law" is
like the dropping of a handful of leaves from the branches of a mighty
oak. (The oak itself, incidentally, is still in the process of growth,
though its magnitude already extends over nine awe-inspiring volumes.)
The book consists of four brilliant little essays that sweep over centuries
of legal history with a lightness of touch and yet a depth of penetration
that could come only from a pen that had been sweeping over the same
field for more than thirty years.
The essays had their origin in the spring of 1927, when the learned occu-
pant of the Vinerian Chair at Oxford University-the Chair made famous
by its first incumbent, Sir William Blackstone-was invited by the Julius
Rosenwald Foundation for General Law to deliver a series of lectures at
Northwestern University. It is for that reason, no doubt, that the es-
says have, in addition to the range and profundity that were to be expected
from Professor Holdsworth, a liveliness of pace and a directness and vigor
that make them compare favorably even with some of the best essays of
the great Maitland-to whom the author more than once acknowledges his
indebtedness.
Of the various "lessons" that our historian would have us heed, perhaps
the most significant is the one with which he concludes the essay on the
"Contribution of the Common Law to Political Practice and Theory," as
exemplified particularly in the development of the writ of habeas corpus
and the institution of the jury. After a rough but masterly sketch of the
history of these two important pieces of our legal machinery, in which the
role played by the Common Law judges and lawyers is especially noted, the
writer thus points the moral not only of this particular discourse but of
the study of English legal history in general:
Philosophical speculation about law and politics is an attractive pur-
suit. More especially is it attractive to the young. A small knowledge
of the rules of law, a sympathy with hardships which have been ob-
served, and a little ingenuity, are sufficient to make a very pretty
theory. And even for those who are older and more learned, there is
a very real fascination in the construction of theories, which will re-
solve the problems of legal history in a new way, or suggest a new
solution of present day problems of law and politics.
It is a harder task to become a master of Anglo-American law, by
using the history of that law to discover the principles which underlie
its rules, and to elucidate the manner in which these principles have
been developed and adapted to meet the infinite complexities of life in
different ages. But those who have chosen to endure this harder task
have chosen the better part. They are brought into close touch with
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the great lawyers and statesmen of the past, with their difficulties both
technical and political, and with the manner in which they have used
their knowledge of the rules of law, and of the conflicting needs and
beliefs and aspirations of their day, to adapt the law and institutions
of the state to new conditions. These students of our law will thus
learn, even though it is only at second hand, something of the practical
wisdom which comes from knowledge of affairs. They will, for that
reason, be able to suggest solutions of present problems which will de-
pend not merely on their own unaided genius, but on the accumulated
wisdom of the past; for, as Hale said, "it is most certain that time and
long experience is much more ingenious, subtle and judicious, than all
the wisest and acutest wits in the world coexisting can be." But, being
students of modern law, and cognizant of modern conditions, they will
not overlook the modern theories of legal and political philosophers.
Helped by history, they will be able to apply to them a critical intelli-
gence which can discriminate between the possible and the impossible,
and a capacity to convert what is valuable in them to the development
and the adaptation of the law to the needs of their own day.
This passage has been quoted in its entirety not only because of the elo-
quent and yet restrained tribute that it pays to the value of legal history,
but also because it clearly indicates that the learned historian, despite his
evident partiality to the common law, is yet wholesomely free from the
blind adulation and the bigoted conservatism that have characterized many
a great common lawyer of the past. His sympathy with the spirit of our
legal theorists and reformists is apparent from his comments on the work
of Jeremy Bentham, of whom he says, at one place:
Even now, when his theory of utility, as he expounded it, has ceased
to inspire the enthusiasm which it inspired in the earlier half of the
nineteenth century, his influence still lives . . . because the use
which Bentham and his school made of that principle "expelled mysti-
cism from the philosophy of law, and set the example of viewing laws
in a practical light, as means to certain definite and precise ends."
On the other hand, tolerant as is the Oxford professor toward the
spirit of reform, he cannot disguise his impatience with the more radical
views expressed by theorists of the school of Duguit, for example. Thus
Duguit's famous theory of the functional rather than sovereign character
of the State, which found such a ready and brilliant advocate in Harold
Laski, as well as his corollary and equally modernistic views about incor-
porate and voluntary associations, is disposed of rather unceremoniously
as a scheme which will "take us right back to the anarchy of mediaeval
political society." It must be admitted, however, that the author's own
views on Sovereignty and Corporateness have more significance for the
citizens of his own country than they do for his American readers. In the
United States, the legal status of corporations presents problems of an en-
tirely different order from those that are apparently agitating the minds
of English as well as Continental jurists and legislators.
Nevertheless, after making all allowances for an undoubtedly English
point of view, the student of historical and comparative jurisprudence will
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss2/21
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
find the essays in this book as stimulating as any that he has yet read in
the field of legal history.
ISRAEL TREXMAN.
St. Louis, Missouri.
AmcRAFT LAw-MADE PLAIN, by George B. Logan. St. Louis, 1928. Pp.
155.
It should be a satisfaction to the Bar of St. Louis that one of its members
has written one of the pioneer works on the subject of Aviation Law. We
read almost daily of new enterprises in the aircraft industry and in air
transportation which are to center in St. Louis, and Mr. Logan's book of-
fers to the practitioner and to the layman an agreeable opportunity to
learn the up-to-date developments in the law affecting this new science and
industry.
In the welter of dry legal treatises, it is most refreshing to find a book
written in the lively style of Mr. Logan's volume. The author's style is
untrammelled by the ponderous manner of our legal Scribes and Pharisees;
he makes no bones about relegating the "ad coelum" maxim of ownership
of the air spaces to the domain of "legal gossip." In the interests of ver-
acity we can even pardon him a certain disrespect for the noble profession
when he compares the lawyer to the night watchman because "he prefers
to do no more work than necessary."
But it is not to be assumed, because he occasionally indulges in the ver-
nacular, that Mr. Logan has failed in scholarly consideration of his sub-
ject. He covers not merely the specific decisions and theories applicable
to aircraft law, but also briefly reviews, for the benefit of the layman, some
of the fundamental rules of the Common Law relevant to the operation of
aircraft and air ports. Moreover, and notwithstanding the popular
character of the work, Mr. Logan cites the conclusions and principles de-
veloped by European scholars and courts with reference to aircraft law.
The book is divided into five parts, covering (first) problems of trespass
and nuisance in flying, (second) police regulations, Federal, State and
International, (third) liability to groundsmen, employees, passengers and
shippers, (fourth) the effect upon insurance of participation in aviation,
and (fifth) venue and jurisdiction in aircraft cases.
One of the most interesting discussions has reference to the as yet un-
crystallized rules of liability of the aviator and plane owner to the grounds-
man, for damage to person or property on the ground. Mr. Logan (per-
haps with undue conservatism) characterizes as "heresy, treason and an-
archy" his theory that on account of difficulties of evidence, a rule of abso-
lute liability should be adopted in such cases. It appears that the rule
for which he contends has in substance been incorporated in the Uniform
State Law of Aeronautics now in effect in ten or more states of the Union.
Mr. Logan does not, however, contend for the extension of such a rule to
criminal cases. The case of People v. Crossan (Cal., 1927), 261 P. 532, a
manslaughter case, offers an interesting commentary upon the suggested
rule of evidence in its application to criminal cases.
Mr. Logan's book, omitting the appendix (a digest of state Statutes, in-
cluding the Air Commerce Act of 1926), comprises only about one hundred
pages, and is recommended as an instructive and entertaining work, well
worth the time requird for its perusal.
R. WALSTON CHUBB.
St. Louis, Missouri.
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